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 Global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have given rise 
to international regimes that cover nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, respectively. These 
regimes each have at their core a global treaty: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
Over time, a number of other initiatives have sprung up alongside these treaties. Yet, while a 
tremendous amount of cooperative activity takes place beyond the core nonproliferation treaties, 
there is very little research dedicated to a comparative analysis of these efforts. This project 
addresses this gap in our knowledge by providing the first systematic comparative analysis of 
cooperative nonproliferation activities beyond the core treaties. It has two goals: to identify sources 
of cooperative nonproliferation activities and to assess the effectiveness of such endeavors. 
 
 Much of the nonproliferation cooperation that has emerged has a practical, operational 
component. This places a premium on working-level relationships. As a consequence, transnational 
connections among professional experts have an important influence on the implementation of 
cooperation. The initial motivations for attempting cooperation, however, often lie elsewhere. The 
project finds that cooperation has been shaped by states’ own self-interests and by U.S. leadership. 
Neither of these factors, however, operates in a completely straightforward way. Interests can be 
reinterpreted, and U.S. leadership can backfire when it is exercised in a heavy-handed manner. Other 
factors that help explain patterns of cooperation include the spread of norms, the national capacities 
of different states to carry out required activities, and the presence or absence of domestic political 
constraints on cooperation.  
 
 Assessing effectiveness proved difficult. Although it is often not feasible to estimate an 
overall success level, for many of the initiatives studied it is possible to point to clear examples of 
successful implementation of program objectives. On balance, cooperative nonproliferation 
activities make a positive contribution to nonproliferation and problems would likely be worse 
without them. Several policy recommendations follow in this report. In particular, there is a need to 
improve coherence and integration among the multiple cooperative endeavors. In addition, many 
initiatives place burdens on developing countries that can accentuate their concerns about gaps 
between “haves” and “have-nots.” Efforts to provide assistance and to re-frame nonproliferation 
measures as part of broader efforts to achieve collective security can help alleviate these problems. 
Finally, it can be helpful to separate nonproliferation from ideological debates about the pros and 
cons of “multilateralism” in general. Both informal small group efforts and more institutionalized 
global measures can have a positive impact. The pursuit of cooperative approaches to dealing with 
proliferation risks remains worthwhile; it will most likely involve an ongoing process of building 





 Global efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have given rise 
to international regimes that cover nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, respectively. These 
regimes each have at their core a global treaty: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
Although these treaties are important, they do not exhaust the full range of global nonproliferation 
efforts. A number of other initiatives have sprung up alongside the core nonproliferation treaties.  
 
 These efforts began in the 1970s and 1980s with the creation of multilateral export control 
regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group, which seek to control 
exports that could be useful in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs. There have also 
been regional initiatives. In 1991, for example, Argentina and Brazil created the Brazilian-Argentine 
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to verify, at a time when neither 
country had yet signed the NPT, that each was complying with full-scope safeguards on its nuclear 
activities. 
 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union spurred new efforts, such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) program to help former Soviet republics secure and dismantle nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. Subsequent initiatives that complement the CTR program include 
the Group of 8 (G-8) Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction and the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative 
(GTRI). The September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks and the discovery of the A.Q. Khan network 
stimulated further cooperative endeavors such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, both of which aim to reduce trafficking in WMD-
related materials. More recently, President Barack Obama attempted to build on these efforts by 
launching a series of nuclear security summits starting in 2010. 
 
 In short, there is a tremendous amount of cooperative activity that takes place beyond the 
core nonproliferation treaties. Many of these initiatives have attracted the attention of analysts, and 
there are now multiple studies of several of them, such as CTR,1 PSI,2 and UNSCR 1540.3 Each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, John M. Shields and William C. Potter, eds., Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Jason D. Ellis, Defense by Other Means: The 
Politics of U.S.-NIS Threat Reduction and Nuclear Security Cooperation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001); Togzhan Kassenova, 
From Antagonism to Partnership: The Uneasy Path of U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction (Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2007); 
Sharon K. Weiner, Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2011). 
2 For example, Andrew C. Winner, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction,” Washington 
Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005), 129-43; Mark R. Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for 





initiative, however, is typically studied in isolation. There is very little research dedicated to a 
comparative analysis4 from which one might draw broader lessons about the sources and 
effectiveness of international cooperation to promote nonproliferation. This project addresses this 
gap in our knowledge by providing the first systematic comparative analysis of cooperative 
nonproliferation activities beyond the core nonproliferation treaties. 
 
 This project has two goals: to identify sources of cooperative nonproliferation activities and 
to assess the effectiveness of such endeavors. First, this project examines the activities listed above 
as instances of international cooperation. It seeks to understand the origins of these efforts and why 
key states either do or do not cooperate with the various initiatives. To assist in this process, the 
Principal Investigator (PI) carried out a review of existing literature on international cooperation to 
identify factors that could prove relevant in explaining cooperation on nonproliferation.  
 
 Based on this review, it appears that reality has moved beyond existing theory. Some of the 
activities taking place in the nonproliferation realm are not easy to describe and explain within the 
existing analytical frameworks for discussing cooperation. Since the core treaties were signed, 
cooperation in practice has gradually become less about negotiating formal international agreements 
and more about building new forms of cooperation, many of which are operationally oriented. 
Treaties have not ceased to be a goal – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and several 
regional nuclear-weapon-free zones have been negotiated, and there is still interest in a fissile 
material cutoff treaty (FMCT). But with most of the key treaties established, cooperation has 
become more a matter of doing additional things that cannot necessarily be accomplished through a 
signature on a treaty. International cooperation theory has focused mainly on whether states reach 
or comply with agreements, or if they create or sustain international organizations. Much of 
nonproliferation activity today does not look like this. Important elements of nonproliferation 
involve building and expanding cooperative arrangements, often through working-level 
relationships, and sometimes, though not always, this does not require reaching new formal 
agreements. If this is the case, our frameworks for analyzing cooperation need to consider not only 
how agreements to cooperate are reached but also how they are made operational. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Security Initiative: Lessons for Using Nonbinding Agreements,” Working Paper, International Institutions and Global 
Governance Program, Council on Foreign Relations, July 2011; David A. Cooper, “Challenging Contemporary Notions 
of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for ‘Middle Power Theory,’” Foreign Policy 
Analysis 7, no. 3 (July 2011). 
3 For example, Olivia Bosch and Peter van Ham, eds., Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 
1540 (London: Chatham House, 2007); Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional 
Organizations (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2008). 
4 There are two partial exceptions, but neither has the same focus as this project: Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, 
eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2009); Christopher Daase and Oliver Meier, eds., Arms Control in the 21st Century: Between Coercion and 





 As a second goal, this project seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of various multilateral 
measures in contributing to nonproliferation. The project does not aspire to the kind of precisely 
quantified assessment a government agency responsible for program evaluation might report, as this 
level of detail is not necessary for the project’s purposes. Rather, the goal is a rough, preliminary 
assessment of each initiative examined here. The focus is not on labeling any individual program an 
unmitigated success or failure, but rather on estimating relative effectiveness across the different 
types of activities. If some initiatives have performed better than others, then comparison should 
make is possible to draw policy-relevant lessons about factors that make international cooperation 




 This study utilizes the comparative case study method. Subject matter experts were recruited 
to write analyses of specific programs or sets of activities involving international cooperation on 
WMD nonproliferation. The goal was to be as comprehensive as possible in the coverage of 
cooperative nonproliferation activities, while still operating within the constraints of the project 
budget and the availability of appropriate subject matter experts. 
 
 The PI developed a starting analytical framework that was provided ahead of time to the 
subject matter experts to guide their research and analysis. The participants then came together for a 
one-day workshop, held in Monterey, CA, on March 30, 2012 (see appendix for details). About 20 
people participated in the invitation-only workshop. The researchers presented their initial findings 
and received feedback from designated discussants who had been recruited to comment on the 
papers. Researchers also received feedback from the other project participants and invited attendees 
of the workshop. Based on discussions at the workshop and subsequent written feedback provided 
by the PI, the project participants revised their papers into final products.  
 
NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION: THE PROJECT FRAMEWORK 
 
 One goal of this project is to gain a better understanding of the sources of cooperation on 
nonproliferation. This involves exploring both the origins of cooperative initiatives and the reasons 
why individual states do or do not participate in them. As one way to approach this question, early 
work on this project included a review of alternative theories in International Relations (IR) 
concerning international cooperation.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Classic studies include Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32, 
no. 3 (April 1980), 357-405; Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Robert 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 





 International cooperation is most often explained as a product of national self-interest in an 
increasingly interdependent world. Other strands in the literature emphasize the power and 
leadership of a hegemonic state or changes in knowledge and ideas and the transnational diffusion 
of these new understandings. Additional research points to the workings of domestic politics or 
human psychology and how these might be affected by the negotiating strategies states employ. 
While not specifically focused on international cooperation, experimental research on how people 
actually behave when confronted with collective action problems points to another important factor. 
Cooperation levels substantially increase when players can engage in face-to-face communication.6 
 
 This review suggests that cooperation theory offers useful pointers for identifying potential 
sources of cooperation on nonproliferation, but it does not fully capture the types of cooperation 
involved. In particular, cooperation theory does not devote adequate attention to what might 
broadly be construed as the implementation side, or the steps involved in getting from a policy 
objective to an operating enterprise. In addition, the academic literature tends to assume a single, 
binary outcome of interest: either there is cooperation or there is not. In practice, however, there 
can be multiple steps in the process of achieving and sustaining cooperation, and at times it might be 
useful to disaggregate these into separate stages. 
 
The Increasingly Collaborative Nature of Cooperation 
 
 The observation that nonproliferation cooperation often involves working-level activities 
can be related to a useful distinction in the IR literature on cooperation. Arthur Stein introduced an 
important distinction between “coordination” and “collaboration” scenarios.7 Coordination is 
required in response to “dilemmas of common aversions,” which can be represented in game theory 
by games like chicken or battle of the sexes.8 Here, players need only avoid a particular bad outcome, 
but beyond the minimal coordination required to do so no further cooperation is required. 
Collaboration, in contrast, is needed when states face “dilemmas of common interests,” which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Debates about the merits of the theories proposed in this 
first wave of cooperation theory are usefully summarized in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker 
Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Recent studies and reviews 
include Scott Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); I. 
William Zartman and Saadia Touval, eds., International Cooperation: The Extents and Limits of Multilateralism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Xinyuan Dai and Duncan Snidal, “International Cooperation Theory,” in The 
International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark (Blackwell Publishing, 2010). 
6 Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action,” American Political Science 
Review 92, no. 1 (March 1998), 6-7. 
7 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner, International Regimes. 
8 In chicken, both sides want to avoid a mutually destructive outcome (like a car crash), but each also wants to avoid 
being the only one to cooperate (and hence be labeled the chicken). In battle of the sexes, both sides want to get 
together (for example, on a date), but each has slightly different preferences for what they want to do (such as which 





require them to specify the actions they will take to ensure a particular good outcome. To Stein, 
prisoners’ dilemma (PD) is an example of a collaboration game.9 Coordination games are self-
enforcing – once it is agreed, for instance, that people will drive on the right, there is no unilateral 
incentive to defect and no enforcement is needed (except in cases of drivers who are drunk or bent 
on mayhem). Collaboration games involve incentives to cheat and therefore require an enforcement 
mechanism to maintain cooperation. 
 
 This distinction is reflected in different definitions of cooperation. In a widely embraced 
definition, Keohane depicted international cooperation as involving “policy coordination.”10 Others, 
such as a recent volume by Zartman and Touval, define cooperation as involving “working 
together.”11 This would seem to be a synonym for collaboration, whose root terms suggest “co-
laboring” as the essence of cooperation. An examination of nonproliferation activities will show the 
value of working with both terms and thinking in terms of a spectrum along which cooperation can 
fall, ranging from minimal coordination to robust forms of collaboration. It is necessary, however, 
to move away from Stein’s definitions to something closer to the ordinary dictionary definitions of 
both terms. 
 
 Treaties to control WMD are frequently interpreted as cases of collaboration, but it would 
be better to see them as involving primarily coordination. When the focus is on incentives to cheat, 
arms control looks like collaboration, but this neglects what it takes to actually implement 
cooperation. U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control, for example, has often been described as a response 
to a PD-type situation. If the two sides could not agree on fixed limits on their nuclear arsenals, they 
ran the risk of an expensive and potentially destabilizing arms race. But each feared the other might 
cheat, leading to an insistence (more on the U.S. side than on the Soviet side) on adequate 
verification measures. The nuclear nonproliferation regime can likewise be seen as a multiplayer PD. 
It multilateralizes an implicit series of bilateral “I won’t if you won’t” deals between states not to 
develop nuclear arms. Both Cold War nuclear arms control and the NPT required mutual restraint – 
they rested upon each signatory agreeing not to do certain things conditional on other signatories 
also not doing those things.12 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In PD, two prisoners are each separately offered a deal by the district attorney. If either confesses and also implicates 
the other accomplice, that prisoner will get a reduction of his or her sentence. In the absence of communication or other 
mechanisms to induce the prisoners to stay quiet, the rational incentive for each is to “defect” and implicate the other 
rather than to cooperate (with the other prisoner, not the D.A.). Because both defect and implicate the other, they end 
up with a worse outcome from mutual defection than they would have received from mutual cooperation. 
10 Keohane, After Hegemony, 51-52. This is described as a consensus definition by Helen Milner, “International Theories 
of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992), 467. 
11 Zartman and Touval, International Cooperation, 1. 





 Although IR theorists include both Cold War arms control and the NPT under the rubric of 
collaboration games, this language seems a misnomer. Negotiating the treaties required some 
working together, but thereafter implementation was largely carried out separately. The United 
States and the Soviet Union each made the required changes to their nuclear weapons deployments 
and other nuclear activities on their own, without the other’s assistance, and until late in the Cold 
War each side also had sole responsibility for verifying the other’s compliance by relying on its own 
“national technical means.” The NPT operates similarly. Each non-nuclear state party agrees not to 
have a nuclear weapons program, but either not starting such an effort or dismantling an existing 
program is something it can do on its own without the involvement of other states. Verification 
requires cooperating with an international organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), but again does not require working directly with other states. Because they are basically 
agreements to exercise mutual restraint, both nuclear arms control and the main WMD 
nonproliferation treaties seem closer to coordination, as the dictionary would define that term. They 
require states to act separately to align their policies around common objectives, but do not require 
states to work side by side in a shared endeavor. Rather than a sharp dichotomy between 
coordination and collaboration, this suggests it will be more useful to think in terms of a continuum 
in which traditional arms control and nonproliferation measures – though perhaps involving modest 
collaboration – fall closer to the coordination end. 
 
 The various nonproliferation activities beyond the NPT are to varying degrees more 
collaborative in nature, in the sense that many of them require actually working together. Some, like 
UNSCR 1540, still remain closer to the coordination end of the spectrum; if they choose, states can 
enact the domestic legislation mandated by 1540 on their own without outside help. Other activities, 
like the export control regimes, are slightly more collaborative in nature. They require periodic 
meetings to discuss what should be included on “trigger lists” of items that should not be exported 
freely. Other activities are intensely collaborative. They require personnel from different states to 
work together, sometimes in an ongoing manner. Efforts to secure WMD materials or convert 
former chemical weapons factories are work projects that bring together personnel from two or 
more states. The interdiction activities called for by PSI also involve collaboration, as they can 
require intelligence agencies to share information or navies to carry out joint operations. In short, 
although the trend is not linear or unidirectional, there has been a shift over time in the nature of 
nonproliferation cooperation. Since the NPT entered into force, additional nonproliferation activities have tended 
to move from simple coordination to involve greater elements of collaboration. 
 
 The shift to greater levels of collaboration has mixed implications. On the one hand, it 
increases the potential for friction, as states have to find common ground on the details of carrying 





officials sometimes disagreed about how certain program elements should be managed.13 On the 
other hand, if the role of collaboration is in fact growing over time, this might also be helpful for 
explaining the patterns of cooperation observed in the nonproliferation arena. Because collaboration 
requires working together, it might serve as a conduit or a catalyst for the expansion of cooperation. 
Certainly some working relationships turn sour and serve as a brake on cooperation. But when 
working relationships go well, they might have a multiplier effect on cooperation. As noted earlier, 
face-to-face communication tends to increase cooperation levels, and collaborative endeavors will 
typically require more personal communication than efforts requiring only coordination. 
Collaboration at the working level can lead to increasing levels of trust, the sharing of information or 
know-how, the discovery of new problems that require the further development of cooperation, or 
the emergence or strengthening of transnational identities. 14 There is also the possibility that the 
process might simply result in a greater comfort level with collaboration, as the various parties learn 
how to work together. If this is correct, collaboration might have advantages relative to coordination 
for the goal of fostering cooperation; it involves more potential feedback loops that could reinforce 
and add momentum to cooperative initiatives.  
 
The Stages of Cooperation 
 
 Many of the leading works treat cooperation as binary: states choose either to cooperate or 
to defect; mutual cooperation either emerges or it does not. This study, in contrast, considers 
whether cooperation can be built over time. This makes it useful to disaggregate the process into 
separate stages. 
 
 For purposes of this study, four steps in the cooperation process were identified as most 
likely to be relevant: proposal-making, establishment, enlargement, and implementation. First, 
although regimes can develop organically from custom, nonproliferation initiatives do not tend to 
emerge in this way. Instead, somebody suggests them. Identifying who first proposes an initiative 
and why can hence be an important part of the story. The making of a cooperative proposal will 
often be the first step to examine in an attempt to understand the origins of cooperation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Disputes over legal liability in case of accidents and over taxation of CTR programs slowed or stalled several planned 
U.S. activities in Russia. See John W.R. Leppingwell and Nikolai Sokov, “Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination and 
Weapons Protection, Control, and Accounting,” Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 1 (Spring 2000), 59-75; [U.S.] National 
Research Council and Russian Academy of Sciences, Strengthening U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
Recommendations for Action (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2005), 15-21. 
14 This perspective on collaboration has some similarities to social constructivist discussions of pluralistic security 
communities. Security communities are sets of states that believe war against other members of the community has 
become unthinkable; as a result, states develop expectations that issues involving other states inside (but not outside) the 
community will be dealt with through peaceful means. See Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The difference is that constructivist work on security communities 
assumes that the development of a shared community identity is key. The focus here is more practical. It is whether or 






 The second step involves negotiations or some other mechanism to bring a cooperative 
activity into being. Why do other states come to the table and what accounts for the parties 
eventually reaching an agreement? The second stage is labeled “establishment” rather than 
“negotiation” because some of the activities considered in this study did not emerge from formal 
negotiations. In some cases, such as PSI, one state announced the initiative and invited others to join 
in. In such cases, the states that first respond affirmatively to the invitation effectively establish that 
program as a going enterprise. 
 
 Sometimes, new states join cooperative arrangements after they have been established. This 
process of recruiting additional participants can be called “enlargement.” Examining why these late-
comers decide to come on board may prove instructive. States that hang back at first and then 
change their minds may have different motivational profiles from those who sign on to cooperative 
arrangements from the beginning. 
 
 Finally, it may be important to pay attention to implementation as a distinct step. Many of 
the cooperative activities in the nonproliferation realm require something other than pure self-
restraint (i.e. not starting a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons program). They require states to 
take active steps; in some cases, these steps include working together in an operational way to secure 
or interdict WMD materials. Implementation, in this sense, includes but goes beyond compliance. 
Dismantling chemical weapons is a form of compliance with the CWC. But if a state lacks the 
capacity to do this on its own, it may require help via a supplemental cooperative arrangement. 
Implementing this supplemental arrangement is more a matter of finding an effective way to carry it 
out than a question of compliance. Even if a state has every intention of complying with the CWC, 
chemical disarmament may fail if these other cooperative arrangements do not work. Conversely, 
these more collaborative arrangements are emerging in part because the goals of the WMD 
nonproliferation regimes may not be achievable without them. Implementation is a distinct phase in 
international cooperation, and in the nonproliferation realm it is giving rise to more and more 
efforts to make collaborative activities operational. Because success in this regard is not automatic, it 
is important to consider both what factors lead to cooperative activities and to assess the 
effectiveness of such efforts in accomplishing their goals. The next two sections describe the 
framework that guided assessment of these questions for this project. 
 
Explaining Cooperation: Potentially Relevant Factors 
 
 The case studies in this project examine different cooperative nonproliferation activities. 
Depending on the case, different stages of cooperation may be important. The following questions 






• Who first proposed the cooperative activity and why? 
• How did the activity come to be established as a functioning arrangement? 
• Which key actors joined in the activity and why? Have any critical actors refrained from 
participating and, if so, why? 
• To the extent implementation is necessary, how has the activity been made operational in 
practice? How has it evolved over time and why has it evolved in this way? 
 
 Each of these questions is at least in part about factors that lead to or impede cooperation. 
Based on the review of cooperation theory conducted in the initial stage of this study, the following 
list of seven factors was provided for case study authors to consider. The factors listed here are not 
considered mutually exclusive; different cases might involve different combinations of these factors. 
In addition, it is anticipated that there will also be idiosyncratic elements in each case. 
 
(1) Self-Interest: State interests are the obvious place to start in considering possible explanations for 
nonproliferation cooperation. In some cases, participation will be a result of a rather obvious, direct 
national interest. Desire to strengthen nonproliferation might be especially likely to result from 
perceived security threats, such as might arise when a country fears WMD acquisition by a regional 
rival. Self-interest could also be an explanation for non-cooperation. A state might see a strategic 
advantage in fostering proliferation or have an economic interest in exporting nuclear materials or 
technology, and these interests could account for non-participation in nonproliferation efforts.15 
 
(2) U.S. Leadership: In the time period covered by the cases in this volume, only the United States 
could be considered a hegemonic power. This makes it important to examine whether U.S. 
leadership helps explain nonproliferation cooperation.  
 
(3) Norms and Identity: In some cases, decisions may flow more from national leaders’ feelings 
about what is right or wrong rather than rational cost-benefit calculations. If so, cooperation might 
reflect a normative understanding, for example, that WMD proliferation is bad or that joining 
multilateral institutions is good.16 States that prioritize other norms, such as the NPT’s promise of 
access to peaceful nuclear technology, might instead resist certain post-NPT nonproliferation 
initiatives in the belief that they conflict with these other norms. In other cases, decisions about 
cooperation might be more a function of identity. Some national identities could lead to a desire to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For an attempt to test strategic versus economic motivations for sensitive nuclear exports, see Matthew Kroenig, 
“Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,” American Political Science Review 103, no. 1 (Feb. 
2009), 113-33. 
16 For an argument about the impact of nonproliferation norms associated with the NPT, see Maria Rost Rublee, 





show solidarity with the United States or “the international community,” whereas others might 
provide a motivation to express defiance toward the existing international order.17 
 
(4) Ideas, Learning, and Transnational Networks: In some cases, it will not be immediately obvious 
what best serves a state’s interests or the question of whether an activity serves the national interest 
might be a subject of debate. In some of these cases, the way a state’s decision-makers come to think 
about the relevant problem or activity could be important. Especially in cases where a state changes 
course – from being a holdout to a participant, for instance – a process of “learning” or the embrace 
of “new thinking” might be a key factor.18 In some of these cases, the relevant ideas may be 
transmitted through transnational networks such as an epistemic community.19  
 
(5) Outside Inducements or Persuasion: In some cases, states that are initially reluctant to join a 
nonproliferation initiative might be persuaded or even pressured by outside actors to do so. As Lisa 
Martin has noted with respect to economic sanctions, cooperation in applying multilateral sanctions 
is sometimes achieved through coercive measures.20 In addition to threats, bribes and suasive 
messages can also be used to influence states.21 In cases where states change their policies in a 
cooperative direction, it is worth examining whether they were provided with negative incentives 
(i.e. coercive threats or pressures), positive incentives (i.e. economic aid or other side payments), or 
communications that contained persuasive information or analysis. 
 
(6) Domestic Political Change: In the cooperation literature, it is now widely acknowledged that 
domestic politics can be an important factor.22 In some cases, whether or not to cooperate can be a 
subject of internal disagreement or debate. In these cases, it may be possible to relate a decision 
about whether to participate to the outcome of domestic debate or to a change in governmental 
leadership.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jacques Hymans contends that an identity based on “oppositional nationalism” is often a motivation for state efforts 
to acquire nuclear weapons. Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
18 For an argument that joint learning was important in the case of Argentine-Brazilian denuclearization, see Jeffrey W. 
Knopf, “The Importance of International Learning,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 2 (April 2003), 187-209. 
19 These are transnational networks of technical or scientific experts in a particular field who largely agree on the nature 
of and appropriate solutions to some problem. See Peter M. Haas, ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, 
a special issue of International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992). 
20 Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992).  
21 On the use of positive incentives in nonproliferation, see Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, eds., The Politics of 
Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999); Miroslav Nincic, “Getting 
What You Want: Positive Inducements in International Relations,” International Security 35, no. 1 (summer 2010), 138-83. 
22 I examined the impact of domestic pressures on U.S. decisions to seek nuclear arms control in Jeffrey W. Knopf, 
Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 





(7) Capabilities: The first six factors all have to do with state preferences, i.e. whether or not states 
think it worthwhile to cooperate with a nonproliferation measure. In some cases, a policy may be 
less a function of preferences than of capabilities. A state may lack the necessary resources – money, 
technology, know-how – to be able to participate in some activities. In such cases, it might have an 
interest in or a preference for participating, but still not be able to cooperate in practice. It is also 
possible that states that initially stay out of an activity and later join might do so because of a change 
in capabilities rather than preferences, i.e. because they developed or were provided with the 
necessary capabilities. Hence, capabilities are another factor to consider in explaining 




 In addition to seeking greater understanding of the sources of cooperation on 
nonproliferation, this project also seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative nonproliferation 
activities. Due to both data and time limitations, the cases here are not intended to supply the kind 
of detailed program evaluation that might be carried out by a government oversight office. Rather, 
the goal in each case is to make an informed estimate of how successful each initiative has been in 
achieving its ostensible objectives.  
 
 Broadly speaking, three aspects of each activity are likely to be relevant: the degree of 
cooperation achieved, the extent to which that cooperation generated the intended activity or 
product (e.g. secure nuclear facilities or a common negotiating position on North Korea), and the 
degree to which that product contributed to the successful prevention of proliferation. Reflecting 
these factors, the following questions were suggested to help case study authors in assessing 
cooperative activities: 
 
• What were the primary objectives of the program(s) being studied? 
• How much cooperation was achieved, and how did this compare to the amount of 
cooperation that was sought? 
• To what extent did each program succeed in implementing the activity or activities it was 
intended to promote? What are the program’s most visible accomplishments? What are its 
most visible failures? 
• How successfully did the activity contribute to the goal of nonproliferation? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 One study of compliance with UNSCR 1540 concludes that state compliance is driven more by state capacities than 
by interests. See Douglas M. Stinnett, Bryan R. Early, Cale Horne and Johannes Karreth, “Complying by Denying: 






 In some cases, assessments will likely have to be along the lines of describing the program as 
having a high, medium, or low degree of effectiveness, and perhaps even that judgment will involve 
uncertainty. Even if the evaluations in some individual cases are necessarily rough or incomplete, it 
should still be possible to gain insights from the exercise of going through a systematic assessment. 
In addition, it should also be possible to draw lessons from a comparison across cases. This study 
will not be the final word on the subject. But, because no comparative analysis of cooperative 
nonproliferation activities has ever been carried out previously, the comparative assessment that 
follows should provide valuable insights that help improve the effectiveness of international 




 Prepared with the guidance summarized above, project participants met for a one-day 
workshop in March 2012. The workshop took place via four panel discussions (see appendix for 
details). The first dealt with broad overviews of the theory and history of nonproliferation. The 
second panel focused on some of the first initiatives to deal with the security of nuclear and other 
WMD-related materials. The next panel discussed some of the main post-9/11 initiatives. The final 
panel considered some more ad hoc and regionally focused cooperation efforts. The presentations 




 In the first panel, Jeff Knopf, then of the Naval Postgraduate School, began by summarizing 
the purposes of the project. He presented the analytical framework that is described above. Next, 
Christine Wing of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University (NYU) 
provided a historical overview of the evolution of nonproliferation regimes. She divided this into 
three time periods: Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11. In the first period, nuclear weapons 
and U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations dominated efforts at cooperation, but some efforts to deal with 
biological and chemical weapons and some moves toward multilateral approaches also took place. 
The period from the Cold War to 9/11 involved several key developments: consolidation of the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime, as NPT membership became nearly universal; innovative new 
approaches such as CTR; a greater focus on chemical and biological weapons; and a move from a 
bilateral to a multilateral focus. After 9/11, terrorism became a more important concern; most new 
initiatives were voluntary and informal rather than formal in character; and there was more focus on 
“WMD” as a category rather than nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons being addressed 
separately. Wing closed by raising an important question: do all the initiatives fit together to form a 
single system, or will some of the newer activities serve more to challenge and perhaps undercut the 






 Scott Jones of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia 
discussed the four main multilateral export control regimes (MECRs): the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. He 
noted that the regimes began as small groups of like-minded states, but they have grown in 
membership, some as large as 46 states. Because the regimes operate by consensus, many observers 
have concluded that their larger memberships doom them to failure, since every state has veto 
power. Jones argued this has not happened and the MECRs are more effective than many observers 
give them credit for. He said this was true in part because the regimes require state representatives to 
work together. There are regular meetings at which regime participants review and update the 
control lists and guidelines that are supposed to shape each state’s export control laws. Because 
these meetings still result in progress in updating the control lists, they are a sign the regimes are still 
working. Although the NSG’s treatment of India has been controversial, Jones interpreted India’s 
request to join the NSG as a sign the regime is effective in legitimizing export controls and 
establishing standards for international conduct. 
 
 Mike Malley of the Naval Postgraduate School served as discussant for this panel. He noted 
that it might matter whether or not an individual activity is embedded in a larger context such as a 
treaty regime. Cooperation is likely to be greater with activities that are embedded in this way. In 
subsequent discussion, Bill Potter of the Monterey Institute pointed out that U.S.-Soviet 
cooperation on nonproliferation was quite strong during the Cold War. U.S.-Russian cooperation, 
while it still exists, has in some ways not been as good in the post-9/11 period. Potter also disagreed 
with Scott Jones on the exemption the NSG made to allow the U.S.-India nuclear deal, arguing it 
had really damaged the regime. Finally, Togzhan Kassenova of the Carnegie Endowment observed 
that sometimes it is the great powers that do not comply with rules of the nonproliferation regimes, 




 This panel involved three papers. First, Alan Kuperman of the University of Texas discussed 
the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) program. The United States 
initiated the RERTR program in 1978, in part in response to India’s “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974. 
The program was later absorbed into DOE’s GTRI. The goal of RERTR has been to switch 
research and test nuclear reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be 
used to make a nuclear bomb, to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot be used in 
nuclear warheads unless it undergoes further enrichment. The program has been remarkably 





began – but there have also been some cases of non-cooperation in converting old reactors, 
including in the United States and Russia. 
 
 Kuperman argued that much of the cooperation can actually be explained by coercion. 
When a reactor has needed nuclear fuel supplied by the United States, the United States has enjoyed 
the leverage to mandate conversion of that reactor to use of LEU. Norms have also played a role, as 
some reactor operators were convinced that HEU should no longer be used because of the 
proliferation risk. The RERTR case also provided some support to the hypothesis that working-level 
relationships can be important. U.S.-based scientists worked with the IAEA to produce technical 
analyses that showed conversion to LEU would not degrade reactor performance or be excessively 
costly. These analyses were important in persuading some reactor operators that they could afford to 
undertake conversion. 
 
 Togzhan Kassenova of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace addressed the CTR 
program. She focused on the nuclear dimension in U.S.-Russian relations, setting aside activities 
involving chemical and biological weapons or the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and 
Belarus. She noted that, in contrast to other cases that are multilateral, CTR was mostly bilateral in 
nature. The case highlights the importance of individuals, starting with the roles of Senators Sam 
Nunn and Richard Lugar in getting it going. CTR also reveals the potential power of domestic 
politics as an obstacle to cooperation. Members of the U.S. Congress often feared CTR money 
served largely to free up funds in Russia for its nuclear weapons program, while many Russians felt 
humiliated at having to accept aid from the United States and feared U.S. personnel would discover 
Russia’s sensitive nuclear secrets. Given these obstacles, Kassenova contended that the amount of 
progress accomplished by CTR is quite remarkable. 
 
 Nevertheless, individual CTR programs varied in effectiveness. They were handicapped by a 
lack of trust in U.S.-Russian relations, the inefficiencies in program management resulting from poor 
bureaucratic coordination, and differences in Russian and U.S. political and legal cultures regarding 
issues such as liability. Two of the most successful programs involved lab-to-lab cooperation and 
cooperation between the U.S. and Russian navies on materials protection, control, and accounting 
(MPC&A). These programs succeeded because they built working-level relationships among 
participants who respected each other’s professional expertise and who could operate for a time 
below the radar of higher ranking government officials. Finally, Kassenova cautioned against 
assuming the CTR model can be directly transplanted to other situations. She said it was only 
possible because Russia’s situation in the early 1990s was so desperate, and comparable conditions 






 The third presentation, by Wyn Bowen of Kings College, London, concerned the G-8 
Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Bowen 
noted that the GP is a post-9/11 initiative that was pushed by the United States, but was also 
facilitated in important ways by Canada. The GP was intended to focus on chemical and biological 
weapons, especially through projects in Russia, and hence in some ways complemented CTR. Over 
time, the program expanded in terms of both donors and recipients. According to Bowen, the GP 
has been fairly successful at the operational level in pursuing program activities. For example, 
dismantlement of decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines is nearly completed. Yet the 
program has experienced problems at a more macro level: consensus decision-making made strategic 
planning and program adjustment difficult, countries have not delivered on their financial pledges, 
and some of the initial top priorities ended up being relatively neglected. Domestic politics, such as 
“buy local” provisions, also complicated implementation. 
 
 The discussant for this panel, Jeffrey Fields of DTRA, said the cases show the importance of 
looking at how cooperative agreements emerge in the first place, and not just at implementation. He 
also said we should not conflate lack of trust with the legitimate concerns states might have about 
protecting national security secrets concerning their nuclear programs. One workshop attendee 
observed that the reliance on positive economic incentives to entice other countries to participate in 
projects like CTR can create people with vested interests in a program budget who will later look for 




 The four papers on this panel dealt with overlapping efforts to address the concerns revealed 
by the 9/11 terror attacks and the discovery of the A.Q. Khan network. Emma Belcher of the 
MacArthur Foundation kicked things off with a discussion of the PSI, which is an effort to facilitate 
interdiction of illegal shipments of WMD-related materials. The Bush administration and its 
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, designed PSI to be an activity that would 
not be accompanied by any formal treaty or organization. Belcher observed that, despite the Bush 
administration’s desire to avoid any bureaucratic organization, PSI has in some ways become an 
institution. The Bush administration also started small, with just a few like-minded participants and 
only an embryonic design. PSI has since grown quite a bit, with even Russia moving from being an 
initial critic to a participant (but so far not China). PSI has claimed significant successes, though 
evaluation is hard because there is no mechanism to report interdictions that take place. Belcher also 
pointed out some failures, such as not discovering North Korea’s aid to Syria. Belcher concluded 
that cooperation with PSI could be explained by a combination of self-interest, norms, domestic 





non-binding approach can work, but it helps to have head of state involvement, such as that of 
President Bush. 
 
 Tanya Ogilvie-White, then affiliated with the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, 
analyzed UNSCR 1540. In contrast to PSI, 1540 is legally binding because it was adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Resolution 1540 requires states to criminalize the export or 
transshipment of WMD and to adopt measures to physically protect and secure WMD-related 
materials. There was initially significant resistance to 1540, because states resented the Security 
Council making decisions that would be binding on the rest of the UN membership. 
Implementation was also slow because many states lacked the capacity to meet the requirements of 
1540, were attached to sovereignty norms that conflicted with the nonproliferation and antiterrorism 
norms associated with 1540, and were angered by the way the Bush administration handled these 
issues. Over time, however, support for 1540 has increased. Member states and the UN’s 1540 
Committee have given assistance to help states meet the capacity challenges. The sovereignty norm 
has been finessed by devolving a greater role to regional and sub-regional organizations. 
Furthermore, the change in the United States to the Obama administration led to new U.S. 
government personnel who took a much more active and diplomatic approach to engagement with 
other states on 1540. Implementation of 1540 has probably not been as successful as states claim in 
their reports to the 1540 Committee, but has nevertheless been substantial. The most significant 
remaining gaps include bio-security and resources to actually enforce the new laws being adopted in 
response to 1540. 
 
 Next, Gavin Cameron of the University of Calgary discussed the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The ICSANT is a formal convention while the GICNT is 
an informal instrument that emerged from a bilateral U.S.-Russian initiative. Ironically, participation 
in ICSANT has been limited in some surprising ways, with some countries that normally support 
international law, such as Canada and Sweden, not joining the treaty. One problem faced by the 
ICSANT is that it is more of a counterterrorism measure than a nonproliferation measure, and 
therefore it became entangled in the larger problem that the UN has not been able to reach an 
agreed upon definition of terrorism. The GICNT, in contrast, is primarily an information sharing 
initiative that includes involvement of the private sector. It is only intended to play a supporting role 
to other efforts, including UNSCR 1540. Because it is a small effort with limited funding, it remains 
to be seen whether the GICNT will be sustainable. 
 
 In the remaining paper in this session, Libby Turpen of Booz Allen Hamilton addressed the 
nuclear security summits initiated by President Obama. The second such summit, in Seoul, South 





activity, but rather aim to reinforce other initiatives already underway. The first nuclear security 
summit, in Washington, DC in 2010, appeared fairly successful. Many state participants arrived with 
voluntary new commitments (termed “house gifts”) and the summit agreed to a detailed plan of 
work. The second summit, in Seoul, appeared to lose focus and produced less positive results. 
 
 The nuclear security summits have an ambiguous relationship to the nonproliferation 
regime. Some non-NPT nuclear weapon states have participated. Many NPT non-nuclear states, 
however, resist the idea the nuclear security is being added to the existing NPT obligations, so one 
objective for the summits has been to re-frame nuclear security as an issue of collective security 
rather than nonproliferation. Turpen attributed the cooperation achieved so far largely to U.S. 
leadership and the legitimacy provided when the IAEA completed revisions to its physical 
protection guidelines (INFCIRC 225).  
 
 Turpen also made an important observation that many other participants agreed with. She 
noted that the nuclear security summits continue a “donor-recipient model” in which some states set 
standards for others and then give them assistance. She pointed out that this reinforces cleavages 
between “haves” and “have-nots” in the nuclear sphere, which sometimes produces motivations in 
some states not to cooperate on nonproliferation measures. 
 
 The discussant for this panel, Bill Potter, highlighted the importance of certain individuals in 
the U.S. government in eliciting international support for 1540. He suggested the 2010 nuclear 
security summit turned out better than its 2012 counterpart because President Obama hosted the 
first summit and states wanted to show their support for him, but they did not see it as important to 
do things to bolster the South Korean government. In discussion, Wade Huntley of the Naval 
Postgraduate School pointed out that PSI, and not just 1540, also involved conflicting norms: in this 
case freedom of the seas vs. interdiction of illegal shipments. Gavin Cameron responded to a 
question about membership patterns by asking whether states are likely to choose among different 




 This panel examined one case of a regional initiative and two cases of ad hoc cooperation to 
try to enforce compliance with the NPT. Sara Kutchesfahani of Los Alamos National Lab presented 
a case study of ABACC. She focused on the role of an epistemic community – a transnational 
network of scientific and technical experts and sympathetic government officials – in the creation of 
ABACC. She argued that scientists and academics played a crucial role because they were the ones 
who convinced policymakers that a mutual verification entity was technically feasible and who came 





Argentina and Brazil to abandon potential nuclear weapons programs; economic liberalization and 
transitions to democracy also played roles. But ABACC was essential to give leaders in the two 
countries confidence that they could effectively verify mutual denuclearization. ABACC was not 
sufficient to persuade the rest of the international community about Argentina and Brazil’s 
nonproliferation bona fides, but their successful experience with ABACC made it easier for Argentina 
and Brazil to take the step of joining the NPT. 
 
 The remaining two papers dealt with cooperation among small groups to states to try to 
induce compliance with nonproliferation commitments on the part of Iran and North Korea. Wade 
Huntley of the Naval Postgraduate School discussed the efforts of outside powers to bring about a 
non-nuclear outcome in North Korea. He compared the experience of the Agreed Framework in the 
1990s, which created the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and the 
six-party talks of the 2000s. Huntley noted that this case is unusual because the target of outside 
pressure – North Korea – was also a participant in the cooperation effort, especially as one of the 
states involved in the six-party talks. Huntley noted several difficulties with assessing effectiveness. 
First, these endeavors sought to accomplish more objectives than just ensuring a non-nuclear North 
Korea. Second, there is the counterfactual question of whether North Korea might have progressed 
even further in nuclear weapons development in the absence of these efforts. Finally, although these 
efforts appear to have failed because North Korea has tested nuclear devices, Huntley asked 
whether these efforts have definitively not succeeded, or instead it should be said only that they have 
not succeeded yet but still might in the future. 
 
 David Santoro of the Pacific Forum concluded the formal presentations with a discussion of 
efforts to negotiate an end to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program conducted initially by 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) and later by those three countries plus the 
United States, Russia, and China (the P5+1). He noted that the motivation for the effort was not 
just to solve the Iranian issue, but also to help repair relations among the great powers after the 
disputes over the Iraq war. He argued that the level of great power cooperation achieved has actually 
been quite remarkable. Ironically, as the extent of cooperation increased, the remaining 
disagreements and divisions also became more pronounced. In terms of effectiveness, Santoro 
suggested examining both outcome and process. The process of building cooperation was in some 
ways a success, but the substantive impact on Iran’s behavior has still been a failure to date. 
 
 Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate School commented on the papers. He observed that it 
may be premature to label ABACC a success because there are some signs of potential backsliding in 
Brazil. Arturo Sotomayor of NPS added that the epistemic community in the ABACC case was in 
some ways a perverse result of U.S. pressures. The scientists in Argentina and Brazil initially came 





in response to their nuclear programs. Moltz added that the two time periods discussed by Huntley 
really have different outcomes: while they lasted the Agreed Framework and KEDO enjoyed greater 




 This project sought to raise awareness of the extent of international cooperation on 
nonproliferation, explore the factors that explain cooperation, and evaluate the effectiveness of 
cooperative nonproliferation activities. This section summarizes key findings in each area. 
 
Observations Regarding Cooperation 
 
Cooperation is extensive and expanding, but participation is not universal 
 Beyond the foundational treaties, a number of other cooperative initiatives have emerged. 
New cooperative efforts have been introduced over time, especially following major events such as 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the number of states participating 
in cooperative activities has increased. As a result, the number of specific programs, projects, and 
activities in existence has grown tremendously in recent decades. 
 
 This remarkable scope of cooperation means it is feasible for the U.S. government to 
consider a cooperative approach to addressing potential threats of WMD proliferation. If a 
cooperative approach is effective, it might obviate the need for the United States to pursue a 
unilateral course, with its attendant costs and risks. At the same time, support for the cooperative 
initiatives is not universal. Some key states choose not to participate in at least some of these efforts, 
while others express criticism and do not regard them as legitimate. This means that, while 
cooperative approaches are worth trying, the United States cannot necessarily count on them to 




Self-interest remains the single greatest driver of cooperation, but interests are open to 
reinterpretation and are not always the decisive factor 
 Across the various cases, national interests emerged as the most important factor in 
explaining whether or not states embrace cooperation on behalf of WMD nonproliferation. The 
conventional wisdom holds that globalization and the emergence of dangerous transnational actors 
and networks are making proliferation and terrorism threats that potentially affect all states. With 





nonproliferation activities because they think it is in their interest to address dangers posed by WMD 
proliferation, illicit trafficking networks, and poorly secured nuclear materials. 
 
 Not all states participate in these activities, however, and self-interest also helps explain these 
decisions. Some states do not perceive proliferation or terrorism to be major threats to them, or they 
have other security or economic interests that lead them to oppose some of these initiatives. In 
other cases, states do not cooperate even though it might be in their interests to do so. In some 
cases, considerations of national pride or fairness seem to override the interest calculations states 
might otherwise make. Some countries have become sensitive about what they perceive as being 
dictated to by the United States or the unequal treatment of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” under 
the NPT, and this makes them resistant to taking on additional nonproliferation obligations. 
 
 Finally, it is important to recognize that interests are not set in stone. Perceptions of interests 
can change. In particular, many states that started out as critical of some of the nonproliferation 
initiatives have eventually changed their minds and sought to join in. India, for example, began as 
the initial target of the NSG and now wants to become a member. 
 
U.S. leadership is critical, but can be a double-edged sword 
 With a few exceptions, most of the initiatives examined in this project were first proposed by 
the United States. In most cases, it is hard to imagine them coming into being in the absence of 
strong U.S. leadership. This suggests U.S. leadership will continue to be critical to the future of 
international cooperation on nonproliferation. 
 
 At the same time, the U.S. role does not always have a positive impact. Some states have 
concerns about the extent of U.S. reach as the world’s sole superpower, which makes them reluctant 
to endorse U.S. proposals. The way in which the U.S. government handles its diplomatic outreach 
can make a big difference. When officials take a heavy-handed approach, using harsh language and 
seeming to dismiss the concerns of other countries, this limits support for even those cooperative 
activities that officials want to promote. PSI serves as a case in point. In contrast, when officials take 
a more traditionally diplomatic approach and invest time and energy in finding creative solutions to 
other states’ concerns, U.S. leadership is more effective in eliciting cooperation. 
 
 On the other hand, in selective cases the United States has also been able to apply coercive 
pressure effectively. For this to work, the United States needs to have a source of leverage and be 
acting on behalf of goals that are widely seen as legitimate. As long as it is used sparingly and only 
when circumstances are favorable, coercion can be an effective element of U.S. leadership. But the 






Norms matter, but be aware of conflicting norms 
 In general, participation in cooperative efforts is greater among states that already embrace 
nonproliferation and antiterrorism norms and that already favor international cooperation and 
multilateralism more generally. New cooperative initiatives can also be effective at times in building 
up these norms and encouraging more states to embrace them. 
 
 Initiatives based on norms against proliferation or terrorism can sometimes come into 
conflict with other norms that states embrace. These include sovereignty norms, norms of free trade 
and freedom of the seas, and support for the peaceful use and disarmament pillars of the NPT. 
When norms collide in this way, support for cooperative nonproliferation efforts is reduced. 
Initiatives that operate at the intersection of proliferation and terrorism can also encounter 
difficulties because discussions of terrorism at the UN have involved greater levels of disagreement 
than discussions focused solely on WMD proliferation by states. 
 
Domestic politics can sometimes act as a constraint on cooperation 
 The effects of domestic politics vary considerably. In some cases, domestic constituencies 
favor international cooperation on behalf of nonproliferation. Occasionally, actors outside the state’s 
executive branch are even key entrepreneurs promoting cooperation, as occurred with the roles of 
Senators Nunn and Lugar in bringing CTR into existence. In other cases, domestic audiences 
probably are not paying much attention, leaving state leaders a relatively free hand. Finally, in some 
cases domestic political factors act to constrain the prospects for effective cooperation. This also 
happened in the CTR program, for instance, in the way “buy American” provisions forced the 
program to use equipment that did not always work in Russian facilities. In some other countries, 
U.S. unpopularity with public opinion can also limit the willingness of leaders to go along with 
initiatives associated with the United States. 
 
Capacity issues are important 
 Participation in cooperative nonproliferation efforts is not simply a function of state 
willingness to join in. Capabilities also matter. Some of the more recent initiatives impose far-
reaching obligations on states, and developing countries with limited government capacity can find it 
quite challenging to meet these obligations. In general, this means programs that include 
mechanisms to provide assistance to states in need are likely to elicit greater levels of participation. 
 
Working-level relationships, especially among scientific and technical experts, have become 
a crucial ingredient in many successful endeavors 
 Many cooperative nonproliferation efforts involve operational activities, such as interdicting 
ships carrying illicit WMD-related cargo or dismantling a former chemical weapons production 





criminalize the financing of proliferation or setting up export control systems. Many of these efforts 
require personnel from different states to work together. The quality of these working-level 
relationships has hence become a crucial factor – an intervening variable in the language of social 
science – in the likelihood that cooperative programs will be successful. 
 
 The practical projects that are the focus of many initiatives often have a technical aspect that 
bring people with a particular professional background – in science, economics, or intelligence – into 
contact with fellow professionals. These working relationships among people who are experts in a 
specific discipline are particularly important. A transnational epistemic community of scientists 
designed ABACC. Technical analyses by personnel from U.S. labs helped convince many nuclear 
reactor operators to participate in the RERTR program. The quality of working-level relationships, 
as well as their ability to be insulated from higher level politics, also played a role in the varying 
success of different CTR programs. The lab-to-lab component of MPC&A and the effort to 
improve materials protection at Russian nuclear navy sites both involved good relations between 
U.S. and Russian personnel and hence proceeded more smoothly than many other CTR projects. 
 
 Working-level relationships interact with and can have a multiplier effect on several of the 
other factors noted above. They can influence the way in which states interpret their interests with 
respect to nonproliferation, help supporters of cooperation overcome domestic constraints, or help 
states build up their capacities to participate effectively. Nevertheless, not everything can be 
accomplished at the working level. President Obama initiated the nuclear security summit process in 
part as a way to bring high-level political attention and urgency to issues that cannot necessarily be 
moved forward by personnel at lower levels of state bureaucracies. The greatest progress is likely to 
come when high-level interest empowers individuals at the working level to connect with their 




 Finding ways to evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative nonproliferation activities proved 
to be the most challenging and inconclusive aspect of the project. Most project participants felt they 
could offer only rough judgments of the success of the initiatives they examined. Despite this, it is 
possible to draw some conclusions. 
 
Cooperative nonproliferation has a mixed record, but it is possible to document some major 
successes 
 One of the difficulties in evaluating the initiatives studied in this project is that it is not 
always possible to obtain clear information about whether or not program objectives have been 





judgment, it suggests a mixed record of both remarkable successes and some frustrating failures. In 
some cases, positive achievements can and have been documented in great detail. For example, the 
Nunn-Lugar “scorecard” lists how many warheads, missiles, bombers, subs, and production facilities 
have been dismantled with assistance from CTR.24 U.S. officials have also sometimes announced a 
certain number of PSI interdictions, although they have not provided a basis for outsiders to 
independently verify these claims. Even where a quantitative measure is not possible, one can 
identify clear successes in some efforts. For example, although ABACC does not always function 
smoothly it was successfully created, it still exists, and it contributed in obvious ways to helping 
Argentina and Brazil move away from potential nuclear weapons programs. 
 
 Some cooperative endeavors include reporting requirements that make it possible to track 
progress, though with some uncertainty due to the fact that state reporting might not always be 
accurate. Most countries, for example, have now filed at least one report on their implementation of 
UNSCR 1540. As Ogilvie-White observed, summary tallies by the 1540 Committee of the collected 
country reports show significant progress in meeting some benchmarks set out by 1540 while also 
revealing that many states lag behind in other areas. 
 
 Finally, it also possible to identify some outcomes that appear to be program failures. Syria 
received significant assistance from North Korea in constructing a nuclear facility that was 
eventually destroyed by Israeli bombing. The lack of discovery and interdiction of North Korean 
shipments to Syria can be interpreted as a failure for PSI. There are also two cases that differ in 
significant ways from the other efforts studied for this project: these involved ad hoc cooperation 
among small groups of outside powers to induce North Korea and Iran to abandon the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. So far, at least, both of these efforts have failed to achieve their ostensible 
objectives. 
 
 Although the overall record is mixed, both individual instances of success and partial levels 
of success in achieving program goals represent positive contributions to nonproliferation. As John 
Holmes and Andrew Winner have pointed out with respect to PSI, 100 percent effectiveness is not 
necessary for the program to be worthwhile. As they note, “stopping even one catastrophic terrorist 
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Cooperative efforts have helped raise awareness and promote norms 
 Whether or not it is possible to document specific achievements, there are good reasons to 
believe that the ways governments think and act today are different because of the range of 
international nonproliferation initiatives that have been launched. The various high-level meetings 
and outreach and assistance efforts undertaken have created greater awareness of the dangers 
associated with WMD proliferation, poorly secured nuclear or chemical materials, illicit trafficking 
networks, and transnational terrorist organizations.26 The standards that are set or suggested by 
some of the initiatives also help establish norms that states seek to live up to if they want to be 
perceived as responsible members of the international community. In some cases, an individual may 
act because he or she has become more aware of the dangers associated with WMD proliferation or 
the prevailing practices and standards for preventing it without this action being specifically 
traceable to a particular cooperative initiative. Yet, if that individual action flowed from the increased 
awareness created by international nonproliferation efforts, it would be another form of positive 
contribution arising from those efforts. 
 
Cooperative activities can have other benefits besides their stated objectives 
 In most cases, the cooperative initiatives here have the goal of stopping proliferation by 
addressing one or more sources of proliferation risk, such as legal exports of dual-use items, illicit 
trafficking, or poorly secured nuclear materials. Beyond whatever progress they achieve with respect 
to their stated goal, however, cooperative initiatives can have other second-order or spinoff effects. 
As Wade Huntley pointed out, this can be seen in the North Korea case. The ostensible purpose of 
both the Agreed Framework and the six-party talks was to denuclearize North Korea. Measured 
against that objective, the initiatives ultimately failed, at least to date. Yet, there have also been long-
standing fears that South Korea and Japan might react to a North Korean bomb by initiating nuclear 
weapons programs of their own. Huntley observed that multilateral cooperation on the North Korea 
issue was also intended to help maintain regional stability and demonstrate international 
commitment to the nonproliferation regime as a way to reduce the incentives for Japan and South 
Korea to follow in North Korea’s footsteps. Although these have not been the only factors in 
keeping Japan and South Korea non-nuclear, to whatever extent they have contributed to this 
outcome the Agreed Framework and six-party talks have had benefits that should not be overlooked 
in an assessment of program accomplishments. 
 
 Similar considerations apply to CTR. In this case, the program can be credited with 
considerable success with respect to its primary objectives. In addition to its contributions to 
reducing WMD proliferation risks, however, CTR was also a mechanism, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War rivalry, to begin building trust and habits of cooperation between the 
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United States and Russia. It was not always successful in this regard, as frictions in U.S.-Russian 
relations sometimes spilled over into CTR activities. And, in October 2012, Russia announced it 
would no longer participate in CTR. Nevertheless, whatever contributions CTR made to reducing 
the influence of Cold War thinking on U.S.-Russian relations can be considered a bonus on top of 
its more direct nonproliferation accomplishments. 
 
Proliferation problems would likely be worse in the absence of cooperative nonproliferation 
activities 
 In any program assessment, it can be useful to consider the counterfactual question of what 
would have happened if the programs had never existed. Although this is necessarily a thought 
experiment, it is hard to imagine that the world would be safer today if countries had not acted to 
create the various mechanisms for international cooperation on nonproliferation considered in this 
study. In the absence of export control regimes, CTR, PSI, and various regional initiatives and 
antiterrorism efforts, the record of WMD proliferation and its attendant risks would almost certainly 
have been worse.  
 
 In short, although it proved impossible to quantify exactly the level of success in achieving 
their objectives or the extent to which this has contributed to reducing threats associated with 
proliferation, the various cooperative endeavors studied in this project have clearly made some 
positive contributions. Although there are many criticisms that can be made of cooperative 
nonproliferation activities, the world is better off with them than it would be without them. This 
makes it important to sustain them and to utilize them where appropriate. It also makes it important 




 The key findings lead to five broad policy recommendations. These start with the need to 
recognize the potential utility of cooperative approaches to nonproliferation. But they also include 
recommendations to address potential limitations in the current set of initiatives. 
 
(1) Cooperative nonproliferation programs remain a worthwhile policy option and efforts 
should be made to strengthen them 
 The research for this project showed that cooperative nonproliferation initiatives have made 
valuable contributions to achieving nonproliferation objectives. When decision-makers consider 
options for addressing proliferation dangers, they should be aware that a variety of vehicles for 
international cooperation exist and many of these have achieved some positive results. While 
cooperative approaches have limitations and will not necessarily always be an appropriate part of 






 At the same time, few of the endeavors studied in this project have a perfect record. For 
most of them, there is still room for improvement. Given the potential value of international 
cooperation on nonproliferation, it makes sense to invest in efforts to strengthen the array of 
cooperative initiatives that exist. 
 
(2) U.S. leadership remains essential but requires a deft touch 
 The United States is still the prime mover with respect to getting cooperative initiatives 
underway and attracting support for them. The United States will not be the source of every 
worthwhile idea, and there is scope for other countries to take the lead on particular proposals. But 
U.S. leadership continues to provide vitality to international cooperation. Because heavy-handed 
exercises of U.S. “hegemony” can arouse opposition, however, U.S. leadership will be most effective 
when it is implemented with a light diplomatic touch and sensitivity to how other states perceive the 
issues at stake. 
 
(3) Avoid ideological debates about how to structure cooperation; both informal and 
institutionalized approaches can be effective 
 In U.S. domestic politics, sharp debates periodically emerge between those who favor 
“multilateralism” with all its connotations of working through formal international institutions and 
those who criticize international institutions and favor working informally through “coalitions of the 
willing.” Both approaches, however, can be effective, and sometimes one can start to take on 
characteristics of the other. Many of the initiatives examined in this project began as informal efforts 
by small groups of like-minded states, but over time grew in membership and developed some more 
formal, institutionalized elements. In other cases, a small, ad hoc group of states essentially functions 
as an intermediary on behalf of a formal element of the regime, such as in efforts to persuade Iran 
and North Korea to come into compliance with the NPT. It makes sense to be pragmatic in 
weighing how informal or institutionalized to be in the pursuit of international cooperation. Where 
possible it would be desirable to insulate nonproliferation policy from prevailing partisan and 
ideological cleavages.  
 
 It would also be useful to keep an open mind about possible evolution in how initiatives 
operate after they become established. The creators of PSI, for example, had a strong aversion to 
establishing any new bureaucratic organization in association with the initiative. PSI’s informality, 
however, may be becoming a liability. About 100 states have now endorsed the PSI principles, which 
is a major accomplishment for the initiative, but this growth in membership also makes coordination 
more difficult. What should be the rules, for instance, for sharing intelligence among states that are 
not allies and have no prior history of doing so? In addition, the lack of any mechanism for releasing 





While a degree of operational secrecy is obviously necessary, finding a way to credibly confirm and 
publicize successful interdictions would likely bolster the deterrent effects of PSI on illicit 
trafficking. PSI likely does not require a full-fledged bureaucracy of its own, but finding a way to 
give it greater institutionalization could enhance program effectiveness. 
 
(4) Be sensitive to the needs and perceptions of developing countries, including how these 
are affected by framing27 
 Although not all of the activities studied in this project aspire to universal membership, 
many of them seek to be effective globally. Moreover, some, such as UNCSR 1540, do apply to all 
states. As a result, developing nations find themselves being asked to take on significant new 
burdens. Many of them do not perceive the same level of threat from proliferation and terrorism 
that the United States does. They also have limited resources and government capacities to take on 
some of the tasks being requested of them, and they have competing priorities in the areas of public 
health, education, and economic development. 
 
 As a result, capacity-building has become a crucial aspect of international cooperation on 
nonproliferation. This has led to a greater commitment to provide international assistance to 
countries that need it and efforts to help match donors and recipients. These assistance programs 
are crucially important and need to continue. At the same time, however, the donor-recipient model 
has become something of a double-edged sword. To some extent, it plays into and reinforces long-
running complaints about the division between “haves” and “have-nots,” complaints that are most 
pronounced with regard to the NPT. 
 
 There is a need for more creative thinking about how to avoid reinforcing existing cleavages 
in world politics, because this could eventually undermine support for international cooperation on 
nonproliferation. The cases examined in this project suggest two possible ways to deal with this 
issue. One option would be to do more work via intermediary organizations. Acceptance of UNSCR 
1540 increased once the 1540 Committee started to function and also after regional and sub-regional 
organizations were given larger roles. The two nuclear security summits held to date have similarly 
called for an enhanced IAEA role in nuclear security. Global and regional organizations have 
potential advantages in terms of their legitimacy with and acceptability to developing countries. 
Having such organizations function as intermediaries between donor states and recipients, or 
between “haves” and “have-nots” more generally, could reduce the likelihood of reinforcing some 
of the cleavages associated with the NPT. Possible models exist in other areas of world politics; 
examples include the World Health Organization, the UN World Food Program, or the World 
Bank. These organizations receive contributions from member states but have their own 
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professional staffs determine how to distribute assistance and how to work with aid recipients on 
implementation. A similar model might enable the United States to promote nonproliferation 
objectives while placing itself at arm’s length from program implementation, which might reduce the 
possibility that states will express resentment at perceived U.S. pressure. For countries that are 
comfortable with or actively value a bilateral relationship with the United States, there would be no 
need for such an indirect approach. But it might be useful to have such a mechanism available where 
it would increase the acceptability of a program with another government. For example, perhaps 
some CTR money for chemical weapons dismantlement could be funneled through the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should a future state that has bad 
relations with the United States declare the existence of a chemical weapons stockpile that it cannot 
dispose of safely without assistance. 
 
 A second possible response to the limitations of the donor-recipient model involves the 
framing of initiatives. The United States and other leading countries tend to describe these as being a 
response to the dangers posed by WMD proliferation and terrorism. Yet this framing does not 
necessarily resonate with states that see little threat to themselves from such dangers. In addition, 
the term “threat reduction” can have the unfortunate consequence of making it appear that the 
recipient of assistance is regarded as a threat to be reduced. A process of dialogue about the larger 
purposes and underling principles of the cooperative endeavors might enable them to be re-branded 
in a way that would make them more attractive to developing countries. Something that emphasizes 
security instead of threat and that highlights shared responsibilities among equals might provide a 
way to frame cooperative activities that would elicit greater support. Describing them as efforts to 
promote collective, global, regional, or cooperative security would all be potential options. 
 
(5) There is a need to think more about how the different initiatives relate to each other and 
to the nonproliferation regime, and to improve integration among them 
 It can be quite surprising to realize how many different cooperative activities and initiatives 
exist that deal with the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of 
delivery. This is good news, because it shows the international community has serious concerns 
about the dangers posed by such weapons and that states are willing to work together to try to lessen 
the dangers. But the sheer number of cooperative endeavors also creates complications. To put it 
simply, it is far from clear how all these activities are supposed to fit together. 
 
 One problem is that participants are not the same across the different initiatives. Even the 
different export control regimes have slightly different members. If countries belong to different 
subsets of the various arrangements, it can be hard for governments to coordinate with each other 
because they have made varying sets of commitments. It also makes it hard to integrate the various 






 It also remains unclear how the more informal, voluntary measures are supposed to relate to 
the formal, treaty-based elements of the nonproliferation “regime complex.”28 Most project 
participants view them mainly as supplementary measures intended to fill gaps in the foundational 
treaties. But not all commentators or government officials view them this way. They have also been 
interpreted as ways to bypass the treaties or even as alternatives meant to some degree to supplant 
them. For the sake of achieving nonproliferation goals and enhancing global security, it will be 
necessary to figure out the most effective way of fitting the different pieces together. 
 
 Rather than launch any new cooperative initiatives, governments today need to enter into a 
dialogue to discuss how they view the connections between different cooperative nonproliferation 
measures and how these fit into the broader global security architecture. If serious thought is not 
given to integration of the various activities, there is a risk that cooperative efforts will become 
incoherent or even begin to work at cross-purposes with each other. The goal should not be 
complete consensus or perfect fidelity to some underlying philosophical principle. Rather, the goal 
should be to develop enough of a shared understanding among a working majority of participants 
that it becomes possible to put forward a clear picture of how the cooperative enterprise is supposed 
to work as a whole. While the effort to improve integration is underway, it will also be important to 
continue the work of the individual cooperative initiatives for the practical contributions they can 
make to reducing proliferation dangers. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: BUILDING COOPERATION 
 
 The international regimes that seek to prevent WMD proliferation rest upon foundations 
provided by global treaties: the NPT, BWC, and CWC. By themselves, these treaties have not 
removed every possible risk of proliferation. As a result, states have launched a variety of other 
efforts to address some of the remaining proliferation problems as well as new problems, such as 
possible WMD acquisition by terrorist groups, that have grown in salience since the key 
nonproliferation treaties were concluded. Many of these newer efforts require cooperation, and 
often multilateral cooperation, to achieve their objectives. 
 
 No existing study has focused on and sought to compare the effectiveness of these 
additional cooperative endeavors beyond the core nonproliferation treaties. The goals of this study 
were to examine the sources of cooperation on nonproliferation and assess the effectiveness of 
cooperative nonproliferation activities.  In addition, the research conducted for this project also 
produced one broad observation about the nature of nonproliferation cooperation. The core treaties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





each involve a commitment to self-restraint by each signatory. As such, they are primarily about 
policy coordination. In contrast, many of the cooperative efforts that have emerged since involve 
greater degrees of active collaboration. To the extent this is true, implementation is likely to involve 
something more than merely not doing something, such as not building weapons; implementation 
may actually require carrying out certain operational activities.  This, in turn, is likely to put a greater 
premium on working-level relationships than was necessary when the key treaties were being 
negotiated. 
 
 Existing theories of cooperation do not entirely capture the type of cooperative 
nonproliferation activity that has developed in practice. Mainstream theories focus on what might be 
called “agreeing to cooperate”; they are concerned with whether negotiations result in an agreement, 
whether international institutions will be created or sustained, and whether individual states will 
agree to comply with cooperative arrangements. Social constructivists, in turn, focus on 
“constructing cooperation”; what they mean by this, however, is not physical construction but rather 
developments in the realm of ideas, i.e. whether states construct shared norms and identities that 
lead them to favor cooperation. This study, in contrast, identifies a need to pay attention as well to 
what might be called “building cooperation.”  
 
 States have been building cooperation on nonproliferation in several different ways. First, as 
states come to perceive gaps or shortcomings in the existing set of nonproliferation arrangements, 
they build on these by creating new cooperative activities to address new or unresolved problems. 
Hence, the nonproliferation regime is getting built up over time. Second, as states have to figure out 
how to turn a new idea into reality, they have to build working-level relationships and operational 
capacities necessary to carry out a planned activity. Hence, cooperation is also being built in the very 
prosaic sense of being put together, piece by piece. Third, as cooperative activities get off the 
ground, states sometimes seek additional participants, thereby building up the circle of cooperating 
parties. Thinking in terms of the metaphor of “building cooperation” highlights these practical and 
operational issues in international nonproliferation activities. Future efforts to reduce the dangers 
from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will benefit from actions to consolidate and 
integrate the cooperative nonproliferation initiatives that have been created to date as well as from 
efforts to build upon them further. 
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Multi lateral Cooperation on Non-Proliferation Workshop 
Portola Hotel and Spa 
Monterey, CA • March 29-30, 2012 
 
Hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS),  
Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) 




Thursday, March 29, 2012 
 
Timeline Content Delivery 
6:00-8:00PM Opening Reception  Jack’s Lounge, Portola Hotel  
 
Friday, March 30, 2010 
 
Timeline Content Delivery 
7:30-8:30 Breakfast and Registration Cottonwood 1 
8:30-9:00 Welcome and Orientation 
Jeff Knopf, NPS 
Anne Clunan, NPS and PASCC 
 
Panel 1: Multilateral Cooperation: Theoretical Framework, 
Historical Evolution, and Export Controls 







Export Control Regimes 
Jeff Knopf, NPS 
 
Christine Wing, NYU CIC 
 
Scott Jones, U. Georgia CITS 
10:30-10:45 Coffee-Tea Break Cottonwood 1 







Alan Kuperman, U. Texas  
 
Togzhan Kassenova, CEIP 
 
Wyn Bowen, Kings College 
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Timeline Content Delivery 
12:15-1:15 Lunch Cottonwood 2 








Nuclear Security Summits 
Emma Belcher, MacArthur 
 
Tanya Ogilvie-White, U. 
Canterbury 
Gavin Cameron, U. Calgary 
 
Libby Turpen, BAH 
3:00-3:15 Coffee-Tea Break Cottonwood 1 





Six Party Talks 
 
P-5/EU and Iran 
Sara Kutchesfahani, LANL 
 
Wade Huntley, NPS 
 
David Santoro, PacForum 
4:45-5:15 Wrap up / Review Jeff Knopf, NPS 
6:00 Bus Pickup for Dinner Please meet in the lobby at 6PM 
6:30-9:00 Dinner Tarpy’s Restaurant 
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